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I. INTRODUCTION
It was only seven years ago that the Supreme Court found anti-sodomy
laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.1 As recently as 1986, the
Court had put its imprimatur on the continued criminalization of sodomy in
a brutally dismissive opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 The literal “outlaw
status” of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) people prior to
Lawrence made the attainment of equal rights impossible. However, the
seventeen years between Bowers and Lawrence witnessed a number of
*
Professor of Law, Chapman University. Senior Fellow and Scholar-in-Residence,
Fall 2009, Columbia University Gender and Sexuality Law Program. I am grateful to
the participants of the LatCrit XIV conference for insightful questions and comments
during the presentation of an earlier draft of this paper and to Tiffany Chang for
invaluable research assistance. This article was supported by a sabbatical from
Chapman University during the fall of 2009.
1. See 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (discussed in Part II, infra).
2. See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (discussed in Part II, infra); see also MARTHA J.
NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 84 (2010) (“Bowers is a low point in recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Its result and the harshness of the majority and
concurring opinions not only left vital liberty interests unaddressed but also gave
comfort to the idea that gays are outlaws.”). For further description of the brutality of
Bowers, see Kendall Thomas, Beyond Privacy, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992).
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gains for LGBT people. The landscape has changed even more since
Lawrence, of course, with the ongoing struggle for LGBT rights now
focused on attaining such rights as marriage equality.
Yet during this LatCrit conference, with its focus on “outsiders” gaining
the status of “insiders” and ways in which critical outsider theory and
praxis can make a difference in the policymaking of the “new American
regime,” it seems appropriate to start this article with the stated premise
that attainment of true equality remains elusive. Not only is marriage
equality a reality in only a handful of states, but the 2008 election saw
Arkansas voters forbid adoption rights to gays and lesbians.3 Employment
rights for LGBT people are also insecure in a number of states.4 The
federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) ensures continued inequality
from a federal rights perspective, even for those who live in states that
recognize marriage of same-sex couples.5
Indeed, despite the LGBT community’s extensive support of the Obama
administration, significant frustrations have developed with the slow pace
of promised political change regarding such issues as repealing DOMA and
getting rid of the highly problematic “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. In
recognition of the limits of a political regime for making fundamental
change, this article focuses on the ongoing need for robust judicial
protections of LGBT rights.
Working largely within the framework of traditional equal protection
doctrine,6 this paper expands upon the thesis that arguments regarding
“immutability” have hampered the attainment of true equality for LGBTs.7
3. See Robbie Brown, Antipathy Toward Obama Seen as Helping Arkansas Limit
Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A26 (reporting that Arkansas passed a
referendum that prohibited unmarried couples from adopting or fostering children in
November 2008). The ban, however, was recently struck down in state court after a
group of families represented by the ACLU filed suit challenging the law. See
National Briefing: Arkansas: Adoption Ban Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010,
at A12.
4. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2007-2008 3 (2009) (stating
that only twelve states and the District of Columbia have outlawed employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, while eight states have
outlawed discrimination based solely on sexual orientation).
5. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (stating that for federal
purposes, such as income tax, marriage is defined to exclude same-sex couples).
6. Some scholars have argued persuasively for a complete overhaul of the equal
protection doctrine. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 481, 582 (2004) (arguing for the overhaul of equal protection doctrine through
the imposition of a single standard of review). However, this article takes the current
three-tiered model of equal protection doctrine as a “given” and argues, less
ambitiously, that within the existing framework of review, LGBTs should be accorded
the protections of “suspect classification” status.
7. See M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the “Immutability
Debate” in the Fight for Equality After Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 2-3 (2009)
(arguing that the focus on immutability in discrimination cases has prevented LGBT
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It also contends that a focus on other prongs of “suspect classification”
requirements within the equal protection doctrine argues powerfully for
expanded judicial protections for those individuals who define themselves
as LGBT.
Constitutional issues affecting the rights of LGBT persons have arisen
under the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees both “equal
protection” and the “due process” of law.8 Challenges to discriminatory
laws have been made on both equal protection and due process grounds,
but the focus of this article is on the equal protection doctrine, which I
believe offers the strongest possibility for securing meaningful rights for
LGBT persons.
Protections for LGBT persons under a due process analysis generally
focus on a right to privacy. More than twenty-five years ago, an insightful
student note in the Harvard Law Review succinctly explained why
providing protections under a “privacy” rubric is incomplete and suffers
from theoretical limitations:
Although extending the protection of privacy doctrine to consensual gay
conduct might help to promote gay equality, privacy analysis suffers
from fundamental flaws in its conception of social relations in general
and homosexuality in particular. Privacy analysis assumes a dual
structure—a division between the home and the outside world—that
does not adequately capture the complexity of social life.9

Even more problematically, “[r]elegating sexuality to the private sphere”
smacks of the old “separate but equal” doctrine. “Withholding social
recognition from the public aspects of gay personhood while
‘[h]eterosexual society revolves around its sexual orientation’ is inherently
unequal not only in its substantive restriction of gay liberties, but also in its
imputation of stigma: homosexuality, like obscenity, may be tolerated only
if quarantined.”10
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a law that discriminates against a
individuals from obtaining legal equality and that courts should follow the California
Supreme Court’s lead in In re Marriage Cases and abandon immutability in favor of an
analysis based on the question of whether the trait leading to discrimination is so
integral to a person’s identity that s/he should not be required to change it).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that the states may not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process, nor deny anyone equal
protection under their laws”).
9. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1289 (1985) (footnotes omitted)
(arguing that the privacy doctrine’s public versus private dichotomy is inadequate
because most people experience at least four overlapping “spheres” in their lives, each
one exhibiting both public and private qualities).
10. See id. at 1290-91 (contending that the public versus private dichotomy is
inadequate to promote the advancement of gay rights because homosexuality is an
aspect of an individual’s personality that must be expressed both publicly and privately
rather than a type of conduct that only takes place in private).
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particular group of people has traditionally been subject to one of three
levels of scrutiny: “rational basis” review, “intermediate scrutiny,” or
“strict scrutiny.” While most laws are subject to only rational basis
analysis, which gives great deference to the state’s actions, those that
discriminate based upon a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classification
receive heightened scrutiny.11
Following this Introduction, Part II of this article will lay out the history
of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of LGBT rights,12 starting with
Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to anti-sodomy laws brought under the Due Process Clause.13
The article will then outline the Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans and
Lawrence v. Texas, which were decided pursuant to rational basis review
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, respectively.14 Part
III will briefly address the limits of those decisions for the development of
robust protections for LGBT individuals and will address the ways in
which questions regarding “immutability” have disserved LGBT persons in
the development of equal protection law. The article concludes that equal
protection doctrine and rhetoric would be improved by abandoning any
focus on “immutability.”

11. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (explaining that
state action with regard to state welfare programs must only be rationally related to its
objective and devoid of “invidious discrimination” in order to be upheld). Under strict
scrutiny, the state must satisfy a more exacting standard: the law in question must be
narrowly tailored to address a “compelling” state interest. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (indicating that certain statutory
classifications are often motivated by prejudice and are seldom relevant to the
achievement of a legitimate state interest). Race, alienage, and national origin have
traditionally been deemed “suspect classifications.” See, e.g., id. (suggesting that these
factors are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that all laws that restrict
the rights of a particular racial group are “immediately suspect”). In federal
jurisprudence, gender falls in the mid-spectrum, as classifications based upon gender
are deemed “quasi-suspect” and must be shown to have a substantial relationship to an
important government interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976)
(invalidating a statute that permitted women to purchase beer with an alcohol content
of 3.2% at age eighteen and men at the age of twenty-one).
12. I note that the Bowers Court used the term “homosexual” and the Romer Court
dealt with an underlying attempt to amend the state constitution to eliminate
protections for gay, lesbian or bisexual persons; neither decision dealt with issues
related to transgender persons. However, I use the term “LGBT” throughout this
article because it is more inclusive and because transgender persons have suffered a
history of discrimination similar to that faced by gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons.
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The case descriptions contained in
this Part are modified from Darmer & Chang, supra note 7.
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 529 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
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II. BOWERS, ROMER, AND LAWRENCE: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LGBT PROTECTIONS
In the narrative underlying Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Hardwick was
arrested for sodomy when a police officer entered his home and found him
engaging in oral sex with another man.15 Hardwick challenged the Georgia
anti-sodomy law, which prohibited oral and anal sex between both
different-sex and same-sex couples, arguing that the right to privacy is
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and protects personal liberty in
private sexual matters. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held
that “homosexual sodomy” was not a fundamental right.16 Because the
Court determined that enforcing morality was a legitimate governmental
interest, it found that the law survived rational basis review.17 The Court
decided the case as a matter of due process rather than equal protection.
The decision underwent withering criticism in the academic community,
particularly for its almost singular focus on “homosexual sodomy” despite
the fact that the statute at issue applied to heterosexual sodomy as well.18
In Beyond Privacy, Professor Kendall Thomas issued a particularly
stinging indictment of the case, arguing that it effectively legitimated
violence perpetrated upon gay men and lesbians.19 As Thomas put it, “the
lived experience of gay men and lesbians under the legal regime challenged
and upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick is one in which government not merely
passively permits, but actively protects, acts of violence directed toward
individuals who are, or are taken to be, homosexual.”20
15. See 478 U.S. at 187-88. By engaging in consensual sexual activity, Hardwick
was violating the Georgia law prohibiting the act of engaging in sodomy with another
man. For a thorough discussion of the background facts of the case, see NUSSBAUM,
supra note 2, at 54-55, 77-79.
16. See 478 U.S at 190-92 (asserting that because homosexual sodomy is neither
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in this nation’s history and
tradition, it does not constitute a fundamental right).
17. See id. at 196 (holding that majoritarian morality provided a rational basis to
uphold the statute).
18. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 150 (1999). He writes:

The Court's decision . . . has become infamous, partly because [majority
opinion author, Justice] White[,] went out of his way to focus on ‘homosexual
sodomy’ and to disrespect “homosexuality,” a feature more pronounced in
Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion, which invoked “JudeoChristian moral standards” and “millennia of moral teaching” against
“homosexual sodomy.”
Id. (citing 478 U.S. 186, 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring)); see also NUSSBAUM, supra
note 2, at 84 (“Bowers is a low point in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Its result
and the harshness of the majority and concurring opinions not only left vital liberty
interests unaddressed but also gave comfort to the idea that gays are outlaws.”).
19. See Thomas, supra note 2.
20. Id. at 1461. Professor Thomas observes that “[l]ike people of color, gay men
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In 1996, however, the Court provided some protections to gay, lesbian,
and bisexual persons under the auspices of the Equal Protection Clause in
Romer v. Evans.21 In its decision, the Court rejected an effort by the State
of Colorado to deny gays and lesbians the protections of antidiscrimination laws via a statewide referendum repealing then-existing
anti-discrimination laws and precluding the future enactment of similar
laws. Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice Kennedy declared, “[a]
State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”22 Finding
the law invalid, the Court invoked only the “rational basis” test in lieu of
upholding the state court’s finding that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
test for a case involving impairment of a fundamental right for gay, lesbian,
and bisexual persons.23
In reaching its decision that the amendment failed equal protection
requirements, the Romer Court rejected Colorado’s primary argument that
the amendment only precluded extension of “special rights” based upon
sexual orientation,24 an argument that Justice Scalia also advanced in his
dissenting opinion.25 Rather, the Court found that “the amendment imposes
a special disability upon [homosexual] persons alone.”26 Indeed, the Court
noted, “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint,” and “[t]hese are protections taken for granted
by most people either because they already have them or do not need
them.”27 The Court also rejected two other arguments for Colorado’s
Amendment Two: first, that it was rooted in the right to freedom of
association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and second, that it was an effort to conserve government resources to
combat discrimination against other groups.28 Repealing and preventing
and lesbians always have to live their lives on guard, knowing that they are vulnerable
to attack at every turn.” Id. at 1465.
21. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). For a thorough discussion of the background of
Romer, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 94-113.
22. See 517 U.S. at 635 (arguing that the Colorado amendment’s legislative end
was not only improper, but served to make homosexuals “unequal to everyone else”).
23. See id. at 625, 631-32 (explaining that the state supreme court held that
Amendment Two was subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment
because it infringed on the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the
political process and stating that the United States Supreme Court would only uphold
the amendment if it was rationally related to a legitimate governmental end).
24. See id. at 631 (asserting that the amendment denies homosexuals the
protections that all other groups of Colorado citizens enjoy and all groups should have
access to remedies when the government endeavors to curb their rights).
25. Id. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 631 (majority opinion).
27. See id. (identifying the special disability placed on homosexual persons by the
Colorado amendment as the inability to seek full inclusion in everyday civic life).
28. See id. at 635 (finding no legitimate governmental objective to justify the
disparate treatment of homosexual persons under Colorado’s Amendment Two because
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any future legislation that protects a particular disadvantaged group, the
Court concluded, did not bear a rational relation to those stated government
interests.29
Justice Kennedy wrote in the Romer decision that “if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”30 Moreover, the
Colorado amendment was “a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”31 The
Court therefore found such animus-based lawmaking to be illegitimate. In
the words of the Court, Amendment Two’s “sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”32 As one scholar noted,
the focus on “animus” was “remarkable” because “it is the only time the
Court has used that word to invalidate a law under equal protection.”33
Arguably, the finding of animus has also limited the application of Romer
in other contexts, where discrimination may be more subtle.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Romer holding sat
uncomfortably with the Court’s earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
which affirmed that sodomy could be criminalized. In Scalia’s view, the
majority opinion flew in the face of precedents such as Bowers v. Hardwick
and Davis v. Beason.34
it was an overbroad law that did not further any legitimate government objective and
because its status-based principle ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
29. See id. (holding that the Colorado amendment was too broad to have been
motivated by the state’s claimed policy goals of supporting freedom of association and
conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups).
30. See id. at 634 (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))
(explaining that a state may not impose laws rooted in animosity towards a particular
class of persons, as they cannot be rationally related to a legitimate government
objective).
31. See id. at 635 (maintaining that laws that classify citizens for any overly broad
purpose are unconstitutional for lack of a rational relation to legitimate state interests).
32. See id. at 632 (adjudging the Colorado amendment unconstitutional because it
imposes an all-encompassing proscription on access to justice and anti-discrimination
protections for a single group, without grounding the prohibition in a legitimate state
objective).
33. See Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis? The Proper
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 685, 718 (2008) (noting that Romer is unique for its analytical focus on
“animus,” but that the Court ultimately struck down the Colorado amendment because
it failed to serve a legitimate state interest).
34. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636, 642, 649-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority’s decision contradicted Bowers by holding that Amendment Two was
impermissible, claiming that it is appropriate to deny gays state protection because
homosexual conduct can be criminalized, and citing Davis for the proposition that
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Seven years later, however, the Court directly overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick by overturning a Texas law criminalizing “deviate sexual
intercourse” between consenting adults. In that case, Lawrence v. Texas,
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, both adult males, were arrested
for having consensual sex with one another when police entered
Lawrence’s home in response to a reported weapons disturbance.35 The
men were charged with and convicted of violating a Texas statute
prohibiting sexual intercourse between people of the same sex, a conviction
that was sustained by the Texas Court of Appeals pursuant to the precedent
set forth in Bowers.36
The Supreme Court invalidated the two men’s convictions on due
process grounds, focusing on the right to privacy.37 In the course of its
opinion, the majority briefly explained why it did not rely upon the Equal
Protection Clause. While acknowledging that equal protection was a
“tenable argument,” the Court noted that if the case were decided on that
basis, then Bowers could be distinguished because that case dealt with an
anti-sodomy law applicable to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.38
Deciding Lawrence based on the Equal Protection Clause would have left
Bowers as good law, thereby permitting similarly discriminatory penal
provisions as long as they applied to opposite-sex as well as same-sex
couples.39 Instead, the Court focused on the Due Process Clause,
explaining that the majority in Bowers erroneously framed the issue as the
right to engage in particular sexual conduct rather than a person’s right to
privacy—including the right to privacy in intimate sexual behavior.40
According to the Court, “[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
conduct running afoul of community morals, such as polygamy, can properly be
criminalized). For a further discussion of the case, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at
107.
35. See 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (indicating that the police complaint described
the petitioners’ crime as “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member
of the same sex”).
36. See id. (explaining that the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
heard and rejected the petitioner’s equal protection and due process arguments under
the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to the precedent established in Bowers v.
Hardwick).
37. See id. (holding that the determination of whether petitioners were “free to
engage” in private homosexual conduct required a reconsideration of Bowers).
38. See id. at 574-75 (reasoning that an assessment under the Equal Protection
Clause may render a statute legislating private sexual conduct valid as long as it applied
to both heterosexual and homosexual behavior).
39. Cf. id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Texas law should be
invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause because it singled out conduct related to
gays and lesbians and was distinguishable from Bowers).
40. See id. at 567 (majority opinion) (describing the laws involved in Bowers and
Lawrence as having “far-reaching consequences, touching upon private human conduct
inside the home”).
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right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”41
Rejecting Bowers in unusually strong terms, Justice Kennedy wrote,
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled.”42 Finding that there was no legitimate governmental
interest to justify the Texas anti-sodomy law, the Court held that private
sexual conduct between two consenting adults is a protected liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause.43 Specifically, the Court asserted,
[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the right to engage in their conduct without
intervention by the government.44

In Romer and Lawrence, the Supreme Court opened the door to
providing LGBTs with limited protections under the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 Nevertheless, the framework the Court provided has led to
inconsistencies in the lower courts.46 Neither Romer, in the equal
protection context, nor Lawrence, using a due process analysis, purported
to apply any form of heightened scrutiny.47 Lower courts have thus been
41. Id.
42. Id. at 578.
43. See id. (distinguishing consensual homosexual sexual practices from non-

consensual sexual conduct and sexual conduct that is otherwise deemed illegal, such as
prostitution or the commission of public sex acts).
44. Id. Contra id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that whether the
Texas law targeted homosexuals, the undisputed history of criminalizing sodomy in
general preempts a finding that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right, as a
fundamental right is defined as “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition”).
Justice Scalia argued that because there was no fundamental right that would invoke
heightened scrutiny, moral disapproval of certain sexual conduct was a legitimate
governmental interest sufficient to satisfy the rational basis test used in the majority’s
due process analysis and the equal protection analysis suggested by Justice O’Connor.
Id. at 599. According to Justice Scalia, existing laws criminalizing “fornication,
bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” were based on sexual morality
and would also presumably fail a rational basis test after Lawrence. Id. However, he
also suggested that there was no equal protection violation in Lawrence because the
Texas law equally prohibited all people—both heterosexuals and homosexuals—from
engaging in sexual acts with someone of the same sex. Id. at 599-600. Lastly, the
dissent attempted to distinguish Lawrence from the anti-miscegenation cases because
while a racially discriminatory purpose is always sufficient to subject a law to strict
scrutiny, in Justice Scalia’s view, only rational basis review applies in cases like
Lawrence, involving discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 600.
45. See id. at 584 (O’Conner, J., concurring) (asserting that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits the “singling out of an identifiable class of citizens for punishment”
where moral disapproval serves as the only asserted state interest).
46. See Darmer & Chang, supra note 7, at 21.
47. Cf. id. (noting that some scholars have suggested that both the Romer and
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able to read the cases narrowly, continuing to permit discrimination against
LGBTs.
III. THE LIMITS OF CURRENT LGBT PROTECTIONS AND RETHINKING THE
“IMMUTABILITY” STANDARD
Despite the significant breakthroughs represented by the extension of
rights by both Romer and Lawrence, their protections have been
incomplete. A paradigmatic example is the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.48 On
remand following the Romer decision, the Court of Appeals in Equality
Foundation upheld a city’s voter initiative to prevent individuals from
gaining protection from discrimination based upon sexual orientation. The
Court distinguished Romer on the ground that the City of Cincinnati’s
initiative was both narrower in scope than Colorado’s Amendment Two
and not motivated merely by “animus.”49
The Court declined to apply any form of heightened scrutiny to a
classification based upon sexual orientation. It did so, in part, by
suggesting that sexual orientation would fail an “immutability”
requirement, a traditional factor in determining whether a classification is
“suspect.”50 Similarly, in Woodward v. United States, where the Federal
Circuit upheld a Navy discharge based upon homosexuality, the Court
proclaimed that “[h]omosexuality, as a definitive trait, differs
fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized suspect or quasisuspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, [which] exhibit immutable
characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature.”51
While the Supreme Court has “never held that only classes with
immutable traits” can achieve suspect classification status, the Court has
“often focused on immutability” in its equal protection jurisprudence.52 An
examination of the Court’s references to immutability, however, reveals
that immutability is not necessary for a classification to be deemed
Lawrence Courts applied de facto heightened scrutiny).
48. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
49. See id. at 299-300 (holding that the Cincinnati initiative was motivated by a
“valid interest to conserve public and private financial resources” and not by a desire to
express “community moral disapproval of homosexuality” as occurred in Colorado).
50. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 502 n.84 (citing Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d
at 293 n.2, 300-01) (noting that “[w]ith some frequency, lower courts have relied on the
‘immutability test’ to refuse close review of sexual orientation-based classifications”).
51. See Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
52. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Norris, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court never intended “immutability” to be
interpreted so strictly that individuals of a class must be physically unable to alter the
trait defining their class).
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“suspect” for classification purposes. Moreover, the “requirement” is
theoretically problematic in the sexual orientation context.
The Supreme Court’s reference to “immutability” in the equal protection
context can be traced to its decision in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., in which the Court confronted discrimination against illegitimate
children.53 In that particular context, the Court noted that “imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.”54 If the state desires to discourage adults
from engaging in particular behaviors, it is inappropriate to burden the
disincentives on their unwitting children.55
Justice Brennan picked up this language from Weber in a plurality
decision the following year in Frontiero v. Richardson.56 Emphasizing the
unfairness of gender discrimination, Justice Brennan provided the
“immutability” of the character trait of sex as one reason why such
discrimination was wrong. Specifically, quoting Weber, he wrote that:
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
character determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of
special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their
sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .57

In Frontiero, Justice Brennan took the notion that a trait belonging to a
person through no fault of his or her own (such as the status of being
“illegitimate”) and added to it the notion of unchangeability in using the
“immutability” label. While closely related, however, the concepts of
faultlessness and unchangeability are analytically distinct.58 As pointed out
by others, an “illegitimate” child can “gain legitimacy” if the child’s
parents marry.59 Similarly, a young child brought into the country illegally,
before she has the autonomy to make such decisions, might be deemed an
53. See 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972) (discussing the lower court’s ruling which upheld
a Louisiana workmen’s compensation statute under which illegitimate children were
denied recovery because legitimate children exhausted existing available benefits).
54. Id. at 175.
55. See id. at 175-76 (noting that while the Court cannot prevent the “social
opprobrium” to which illegitimate children are often subject, it may use the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate discriminatory laws relating to the status conferred on
them at birth).
56. See 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973) (assessing a case wherein a female United States
Air Force lieutenant’s husband was denied benefits on account of being unable to
demonstrate that he was her “dependent”—a burden not required of wives seeking the
military benefits of their enlisted husbands).
57. Id.
58. Cf. Note, supra note 9, at 1302 (“Describing a trait as immutable in an equal
protection analysis often implies that it is unchosen as well as unalterable.”).
59. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 506.
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“undocumented alien” or “illegal alien” though the child is faultless, but
that trait, like “illegitimacy,” is not beyond the capacity for change, as a
child whose parents brought the child into the country without proper
documentation may eventually obtain citizenship.60
What Justice Brennan seems to be expressing, which is intuitively
appealing, is the notion that people should not be “faulted” for aspects of
their personhood that are not choices made by those persons.61 Ordinarily,
though not inevitably, persons do not choose (or change) their gender.
However, even notions of gender are far more fluid now than they were
when Justice Brennan was writing in 1973. Yet, just because I could
theoretically change my gender, is it any more appropriate for me to be
discriminated against on the basis of gender?62 While something unchosen
should surely not subject a person to legal disadvantage, it does not follow
that someone should be subject to legal disadvantage for “retaining” such a
trait that causes no harm to others. To the extent that the idea of
immutability had its genesis in Weber, it is important to note that punishing
children for their illegitimate status was insufficiently connected to any
state goal of disincentivizing irresponsible adult sexual behavior.63 In the
words of the Court, “no child is responsible for his birth.”64 Weber
therefore implicitly problematized the birthing of children out of wedlock,
but made clear that the children themselves were not the responsible
parties.65
A number of scholars have criticized the use of “immutability” in equal
protection doctrine in part because “immutability” is analytically
60. See id. (noting that alienage, like illegitimacy, can be changed). See generally
Jessica Sharon, Passing the Dream Act: Opportunities for Undocumented Aliens, 47
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 599, 620-25 (2007) (highlighting proposed legislation that
would enable the children of illegal immigrants to seek citizenship and better access to
higher education if certain qualifications are met).
61. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680 (noting that sex is an “accident of birth”); cf. id.
at 686-87 (asserting that statutory distinctions between sexes tend to “invidiously
relegate[]” an entire sex to a separate legal status, thus differentiating which sex would
receive benefits and rights without regard to an individual’s needs and capabilities).
62. Cf. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris,
J., concurring) (stressing that racial discrimination would not suddenly become
constitutional if a medical procedure emerged capable of altering one’s skin pigment).
63. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (stating that
discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children in the receipt of workman’s
compensation does not serve the state’s interest in “legitimate family relationships”). I
want to emphasize that I am not myself endorsing the view that adults themselves
should be disincentivized from having children “out of wedlock,” as I personally think
that such families are as equally “legitimate” as those in which children are born and
raised in traditional marriages. The point is that the Court was drawing a distinction
between potentially responsible adults on the one hand and the utterly blameless
children on the other.
64. Id. at 175.
65. Id. at 174-75.
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troublesome when applied to sexual orientation.66 While sympathetic
jurists have noted that “scientific research indicates that one has little
control over our sexual orientation and that, once acquired, our sexual
orientation is largely impervious to change,”67 that view is not universally
shared. Moreover, if a state seeks to regulate conduct, rather than status,
the application of any “immutability” prong can be problematic.
The further problem with a focus on “immutability,” however, is that it
is inherently stigmatizing to ask whether a person’s sexual orientation can
be “changed.”68 Implicit in the very question is the heteronormative
assumption that heterosexuality is the “preferred” sexual orientation and
that it would be better if folks could change their sexual orientation if it
deviates from that norm. The attitude that an unchosen sexual orientation
should not be criminalized or penalized, while perhaps preferable to a
society that terrorizes members of the LGBT community, is still not an
embracing theory that is truly accepting of the legitimacy of being LGBT.
In the 1985 Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, written before either Romer or
Lawrence were decided, the authors argued for extending “suspect
classification” status by refining the immutability question: “[a]n
alternative view of the importance of immutability might thus focus on the
argument that the characteristics of race and sex are important not because
they are (usually) determined at birth, but because they are such
determinative features of personality.”69 Similarly, Judge Norris in his
concurring Watkins opinion suggested:
[r]eading the case law in a more capacious manner, ‘immutability’ may
describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would
be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change
66. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 506 (noting that the “importance accorded to
immutability as an indicia of suspectness runs contrary to the Court's own recognition
that society, not nature, gives many traits their significance”). Goldberg explains that
the “immutablity requirement also finds itself in conflict with the factual reality that
purportedly fixed traits, such as sex, are in fact more alterable and flexible than
commonly presumed.” Id. Furthermore, the “Court itself has acknowledged that the
immutability requirement . . . fails to filter classifications meriting heightened judicial
skepticism in a meaningful way" and has been "subject to greatest misapprehension by
lower courts.” Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, in Martha Nussbaum's recent book,
she offers a sustained critique of immutability. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 11422. She concludes that “the legal notion of immutabiliy is confused, but it leads us to
two good ideas . . . the idea of relevance and the idea of depth or centrality.” Id. at 122.
67. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J. concurring).
68. See id. (suggesting that an appropriate inquiry in demonstrating that
homosexuality is something beyond control is to ask heterosexuals whether they
believe they can alter their sexual orientation).
69. See Note, supra note 9, at 1303 (reasoning that there are a “myriad of
immutable characteristics,” such as eye color, that would not become “grounds for the
creation of a suspect class” and thus subject to heightened scrutiny because of their
relative unimportance to the concept of personhood).
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them, regardless of how easy that change might be physically.70

Reading “immutability” in a generous manner, or seeking to define
immutability in a different way, however, seems to me far less preferable
than simply candidly acknowledging that a requirement of “immutability”
is unnecessary for a finding of suspect classification in the equal protection
context. Rather, a straightforward focus on a trait’s essential connection to
personhood can surely animate equal protection doctrine without trying to
fit that notion under an ill-fitting “immutability” label.71
In Frontiero, the Court’s plurality opinion drew on Weber to explicitly
inquire for the first time whether a trait was “immutable” in the suspect
classification context.72 It also asked whether a characteristic related to an
“ability to perform or contribute to society” might be a legitimate basis for
classification in certain circumstances.73 This analysis seems designed to
uncover whether a classification is legitimate, and the Court’s traditional
focus on whether a group has suffered a history of discrimination is also
helpful in determining whether a classification is “suspect.”74 Where a
group, such as the LGBT community, has demonstrably suffered from a
history of discrimination, it raises the likelihood that efforts to impose
additional burdens on the group or prevent them from enjoying certain
benefits (such as marriage) are borne of historic prejudice, rather than on
any compelling state interest.
Immutability, however, does not clearly “fit” with the goals of equal
protection doctrine. Indeed, as more fully explored in an earlier article,75
the California Supreme Court eschewed an “immutability” requirement
altogether in its recent decision in In re Marriage Cases.76 The court
70. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725-26 (Norris, J. concurring).
71. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) (discussed in Darmer

& Chang, supra note 7).
72. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 501-02 (suggesting that the concept of
immutability was used to “refine and control” those classifications eligible for
heightened scrutiny).
73. See id. at 501 (asserting that the Frontiero Court contrasted gender with
“nonsuspect statuses such as intelligence and physical disability” in order to distinguish
immutable classifications subject to heightened scrutiny).
74. See id. at 503 (indicating that another traditional factor for affording a
particular group suspect status is political powerlessness). While other scholars have
recently problematized the focus on political power, commenting upon those arguments
is beyond the scope of this article.
75. See generally Darmer & Chang, supra note 7 (arguing that a focus on whether
sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic harms the attainment of equality for
LGBTs).
76. See 183 P.3d at 384, superseded in part by amendment, C.A. CONST. art. 1, §
7.5 (the part of the Court’s holding stating that gays and lesbians are a suspect
classification was not affected by the amendment); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d
48, 102 (Cal. 2009) (asserting that the court’s determination that gays and lesbians are a
suspect classification for state equal protection purposes remains good law, albeit
limited in impact by Proposition 8); Darmer & Chang, supra note 7, at 6-7 (suggesting
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likened sexual orientation to religion and found that it was so “integral an
aspect of one’s identity that it is not appropriate to require a person to
repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid
discriminatory treatment.”77 The court disagreed with the lower court in
the case, which rejected a finding of “suspect classification” based upon an
immutability analysis.78
Indeed, the California Supreme Court became the first court in the
country to find that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, an
important finding that will transcend the short-term political setback of
Proposition 8. As Tiffany Chang79 and I have argued elsewhere, “[b]y
finding immutability to be unnecessary and acknowledging the integral
nature of sexual orientation to personhood, the court issued a decision
profoundly respectful of gay men and lesbians that is straightforward in its
analysis of the criteria for finding a classification ‘suspect.’”80
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted to argue further for a rejection of
“immutability” in the equal protection context. While the notion of a trait
being an “accident of birth,” and thus an unfair basis for classification, had
intuitive appeal where illegitimacy was at issue, any requirement for
“immutability” is deeply problematic in the development of equal
protection doctrine with regard to the LGBT community. An immutability
inquiry is inherently stigmatizing and loaded with heteronormative
assumptions. As we move beyond fighting for baseline rights for the
LGBT community and envision a society in which different sexual
orientations are celebrated and embraced, our discourse and doctrine will
hopefully catch up with our ideals.

that In re Marriage Cases assessed fundamental questions regarding the rights of
sexual orientation minorities that will likely prove important in future jurisprudence).
77. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.
78. See id. at 403-04 (discussing the procedural history that upheld laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples because they did not discriminate on the basis of sex).
79. Chang is a 2010 graduate from Chapman University School of Law and a board
member of the Orange County Equality Coalition who has described the discrimination
she has faced as a lesbian. See Darmer & Chang, supra note 7, at 1 nn. 9-11.
80. See id. at 28 (comparing the irrelevancy of immutability with that of current
political powerlessness for the purposes of equal protection analysis).
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